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Abstract
Wireline high-speed networks have become a critical part of modern cyberinfras-
tructures and provide the base substrates to support a full range of higher-layer user
services and applications. Indeed, a wide range of technologies have been deployed in
these domains, ranging from ultra-fast Internet Protocol (IP) packet routing systems
to multi-wavelength optical switching nodes. Today these setups provide immense
levels of traffic scalability, reaching well into the 100s of gigabits/second and even
terabits/second ranges. Owing to this growth, network survivability is now a central
concern, as even a single link or node failure can cause widespread service disruption
for thousands of users or more.
Now over the years, a full range of network survivability schemes have been de-
veloped for packet routing and optical switching networks. Indeed, the open research
literature lists many types of solutions here, broadly classified as pre-fault protection
and post-fault restoration strategies. The former schemes pro-actively setup backup
(redundant) resource pools to overcome anticipated failure events. Meanwhile the
vi
latter strategies are more reactive by design and attempt to re-establish connectivity
after failures. By and large, the bulk of these solutions are only concerned with
single failure recovery, i.e., either at the link or node level. In general, these are
the most common types of faults events experienced in operational networks. How-
ever, recent developments and considerations are pushing the need for more capable
schemes to recover from multiple failure events, i.e., as occurring during natural
disasters, massive power outages, and weapon of massive destruction (WMD) type
attacks. Indeed, these types of scenarios are much more challenging, as they induce
large numbers of correlated failures which can quickly overwhelm most traditional
single-failure recovery schemes.
Along these lines, some recent studies have looked at network recovery under
massive correlated network failures. The key idea here is to introduce probabilistic
risk information into the path provisioning (routing, protection) processes in order to
minimize vulnerability to random failures. However, even though these schemes can
reduce connections failure rates, they yield very high resource inefficiencies (usage
consumption). In turn, these concerns will inhibit their adoption in most practical
network settings, as operators have to balance the need for improved resiliency with
revenue generation. To address this challenge, this thesis proposes a novel multi-
failure survivability scheme that jointly incorporates both risk mitigation and traffic
engineering (TE) efficiency objectives. In particular, the approach leverages multi-
path routing strategies to first compute a selection of diverse working/backup path
pairs and then uses ranking methods to select the most balanced combination. This
framework applies graph-theoretic principles and hence can readily be integrated into
real-world traffic provisioning systems.
The performance of the proposed solution is evaluated using discrete event sim-
ulation techniques for a variety of network topologies and compared against several
existing schemes. Overall findings show that the scheme yields notably improved
vii
survivability rates as compared to vanilla traffic engineering policies. At the same
time, it also gives much better operational resource efficiencies versus existing prob-
abilistic risk reduction routing strategies. Hence network carriers can fully leverage
this new design to achieve much-improved reliability for critical data flows without
sacrificing operational revenues.
viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
High-bandwidth networks have become an indispensable part of modern society.
These infrastructures provide the base communication substrates from which to im-
plement a full range of end-user services. As a result many commercial, govern-
ment, and defense organizations maintain and operate a full range of high-speed
network infrastructures to meet the growing needs of their users. For example, at
the lowest fiber level, optical dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) back-
bones are being used to route gigabit-level lightpath connections across large regional
and national distances. Meanwhile, overlying Internet Protocol (IP) and Ethernet
technologies are also being deployed to provide finer granularity bandwidth control.
Indeed, many of these setups support full quality of service (QoS) provisions via
standardized frameworks such as IP multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) [1] and
differentiated service (DiffServ) [2].
1
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1.1 Background
As network infrastructures have grown and expanded, survivability concerns have
also become more critical. Namely, given the increased scalability of many new
technologies, even a single failure can now cause massive service disruptions for
user services. For example, a DWDM link failure can easily disrupt hundreds of
gigabits/sec of users flows.
In light of the above, a wide range of network failure recovery schemes have
been developed [3]. Broadly, these strategies can be classified as pre-provisioning or
post-provisioning, shown in Figure 1.1. Specifically, the former are usually termed
as “protection” approaches and pre-compute backup routes for all (or part of) the
working end-to-end routes. For example, point-to-point link protection schemes have
been widely used in optical DWDM backbones to provide rapid recovery [4]. Ad-
ditionally, many protection strategies have also been developed for end-to-end path
recovery [5]. These schemes compute backup routes for working (primary) connec-
tions and perform appropriate switch-overs upon failure detection. Within these
strategies, many researchers have also looked shared protection variants to further
improve resource utilization on idle backup routes [3]. However, shared protection
algorithms are strictly premised on single link failure assumptions, i.e., no more than
one link will fail at any given time. Meanwhile, post-provisioning schemes are usually
termed as “restoration” and do not implement pre-computation or pre-reservation of
recovery resources. Instead, active post-fault computation and signaling is done to
recover failed routes. These schemes, generally, cannot guarantee any level of fault
recovery (even against single link failures) and provide slower recovery. However,
restoration usually gives much better resource utilization.
Although there are many existing network recovery solutions, they are mostly
geared towards single link/node failure recovery. As such, these approaches will
2
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Figure 1.1: Protection and restoration strategies
be less efficient in regional multi-failure scenarios, particularly those with correlated
and cascading failures. For example these failure conditions can arise during nat-
ural disasters (such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, etc), large scale
power outages, and even malicious weapon of massive destruction (WMD) attacks.
Point-to-point link protection and shared path protection strategies will be particu-
larly vulnerable here. Hence in order to address these concerns, some recent studies
have proposed newer protection strategies to handle randomized multi-failure sce-
narios. However, it is generally understood that pre-provisioned schemes cannot
3
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guarantee recovery against all possible multi-failure events. As a result, researchers
have assumed probabilistic link failure regions and used various algorithms to try to
minimize the failure probability of end-to-end primary/backup path pairs [6],[7],[8].
Nevertheless, these approaches purely focus on “risk-minimization” and tend to yield
longer routes with higher resource utilization. In turn, this leads to higher blocking
and lower revenues for network carriers.
In light of the above, there is a clear need to develop further protection schemes
to handle multiple correlated failures. Moreover, these new designs should also ad-
dress traffic engineering (TE) resource efficiency concerns in order to deliver more
meaningful solutions for networks carriers. Finally, these algorithms should also have
acceptable computational complexity and be able to integrate with existing network
provisioning frameworks, i.e., routing protocols, path computation engines, etc.
1.2 Motivations
Given the increased vulnerability of large network infrastructures to catastrophic
events, there is a growing need to develop more effective network survivability
schemes. Ideally, these solutions should make provisions for multiple correlated fail-
ures and incorporate probabilistic risk information into the recovery process. How-
ever, even though some related schemes have been proposed in [6], [7], [8], these
strategies only consider risk minimization objectives. As a result, their TE perfor-
mance is generally poor and can lead to high resource consumption and blocking. In
order to address these crucial concerns, this thesis proposes a more balanced network
protection solution which incorporates both failure recovery and TE needs.
4
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1.3 Problem Statement
This thesis proposes a new multi-failure recovery scheme for high-speed networks.
The solution is directly applicable to IP MPLS domains and also can be tailored (with
minor modifications) for use in optical DWDM backbones as well. The performance
of the proposed solution is evaluated and compared against various existing path
protection strategies using network simulation.
1.4 Scope and Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to design a robust multi-failure route protection
solution. The work uses a graph-theoretic heuristics approach and assumes complete
network resources knowledge at the provisioning entity, i.e., centralized control. A
second objective is to also measure the effectiveness of the proposed solution versus
that yielded by some existing schemes.
1.5 Research Approach
To achieve the above objectives, this thesis effort focuses on three core tasks. First,
a detailed survey is conducted to review the latest research work in dual and multi-
failure recovery. This framework is then used as a baseline to develop an improved
(balanced) multi-failure protection scheme. Finally, detailed coding and simulation
studies are done to evaluate the performance of the proposed solution in comparison
to existing solutions. Specifically, all analyses are conduced using custom-developed
models in the OPNET ModelerTM simulation tool environment (i.e., C/C++ pro-
gramming).
5
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1.6 Thesis Outline
This thesis report is organized as follows. First, Chapter 2 presents a survey of the
different approaches and latest techniques for dual-failure and multi-failure protec-
tion in high-speed networks. Next, Chapter 3 presents the proposed multi-failure
protection solution, complete with detailed pseudocode listings. Chapter 4 then fo-
cuses on simulation design and defines the appropriate topologies used along with
key performance evaluation metrics. Subsequently, Chapter 5 analyses the recovery
and TE performances of the scheme for various failure scenarios. Finally, conclusions
and further research directions are outlined in Chapter 6.
6
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Network Survivability: A Review
Network recovery from failed connections has always been a critical concern and many
different strategies have been developed and studied over the years. In particular,
most of these schemes are tailored to handle specific failure conditions. Along these
lines, this chapter presents a brief survey of this topic area. Namely, the first part
focuses on defining specific failure types and providing a general high-level taxonomy
of different survivability schemes. Meanwhile the second part of the chapter focuses
on specialized dual- and multi-failure recovery solutions, which are the main focus
of this thesis study.
2.1 Failure Models and Survivability Mechanisms
According to [9], a failure is defined as a disruption in traffic caused by a malfunction
of one or more components. Now, the wider literature lists many different types of
failures that may occur in network settings. In turn, these failures have a strong
impact on the type of recovery schemes developed. Overall, the most common failure
types are :
7
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• Link failures: These disruptions are caused by damage to an optical fiber or
a link component. The common reasons here can include fiber cuts, malfunc-
tioning port interfaces, and damaged amplifier and regenerators (in the case of
optical DWDM networks). Overall a link failure is considered as an individual
failure as it only affects a single component in a network.
• Node failures: These failures occur when a whole router or switching node goes
down and are generally less common and more serious in nature. The common
causes here include operator errors or power outages. Regardless, node failures
are still considered as individual failures even though they may induce multiple
link failures, i.e., nodes are also treated as individual components of a network.
• End-system failures: These failures affect the actual end-user systems generat-
ing data for transmission and reception, i.e., hardware/software components at
the end of the communication routes (sender and receiver equipment). These
faults can be caused by failure of a single communication channel, failure of a
transceiver equipment, or even software faults.
• Path failures: These failures are more general and can be caused by one or more
of the above faults, i.e., if one or more link(s) or node(s) fail. In this case, the
whole end-to-end communication path will be affected.
Meanwhile survivability is defined as the ability of the network to maintain an
acceptable level of service after failure(s) within the network [3]. Now depending
upon the type of failures, various recovery strategies have been proposed. For exam-
ple, some approaches may treat link or nodes failures as isolated single events and
compute sub-routes to avoid the affected entities. Meanwhile other approaches may
treat whole path failures and table solutions to compute new “end-to-end” source to
destination routes.
8
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Based upon the above, the literature lists two broad classes of survivability/reco-
very schemes, delineated by their mode of operation, i.e., pre-failure and post-failure.
• Network protection: This is a pro-active (pre-provisioning) mechanism in which
the backup routes are computed at setup, i.e., when the working route is com-
puted. Protection can be applied at the individual link, sub-route, or at full
end-to-end path levels. Overall, this strategy requires pre-reservation of re-
sources on backup routes and hence entails higher resource consumption, i.e.,
since the reserved resources are kept idle until the occurrence of a failure. To
address this concern, improved shared protection strategies have also been de-
fined to allow working routes to share backup resources in case of single failure
events [3]. Overall, the main advantage of the protection approach is that it
provides very fast and guaranteed recovery, minimizing the loss of data due to
recover delays.
• Network restoration: This is a reactive (post-provisioning) mechanism in which
backup routes (or sub-routes) are computed and selected after the failure of a
route or link. Unlike protection, restoration does not reserve backup resources.
Clearly, this leads to a better resource usage and allows for supporting more
user communication requests. However restoration has the disadvantage of in-
creased recovery times (higher data losses) since it does active re-computation
of backup routes after the detection of the failure. Also, a more serious con-
cern is that these strategies may not be able to provide recovery under all
circumstances, i.e., even for single link failures.
In light of the above, this thesis focuses on protection design strategies for multiple
failure scenarios. A more detailed survey of related schemes in this particular sub-
area is now presented.
9
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2.2 Dual-Link Failure Survivability Schemes
Over the years several studies have looked at dual (independent) link failure recovery
in networks. One of the key challenges here is to ensure that such failures do not
impact both the working and the backup paths of a routed demand, as shown in
Figure 2.1. For example [10] motivates the problem for dual independent failures (i.e.,
occurring in an unspecified arbitrary order) and details some real-world scenarios
where these type of faults may occur. Subsequently, three solutions are proposed
to re-route around failed links using pre-assigned capacity with the assumption that
the network graph is also 3-connected, i.e., Menger’s Theorem [11]. In particular,
the first two methods require identification of the failed links and pre-compute two
link-disjoint backup paths, b1(e) and b2(e), for each link in a working path, w(e).
Upon occurrence of the first link failure e, b1(e) is then used to reroute the traffic.
Now a double-link failure scenarios appears when a second link f may also fail after
link e fails. Here four possible cases are identified, depending upon the location of the
second failure. Meanwhile the third solution only pre-computes a single backup path,
b(e), for each link e by using various algorithms, see [10] for details. Overall, these
schemes are analyzed for three different network topologies, including ARPANET,
New Jersey LATA (NJLATA), and a large national backbone. Results indicate that
it is possible to achieve 100% recovery for dual-link failures with a modest increase in
backup capacity. In particular, the first two methods show lower capacity usage and
yield shorter hop-lengths, but also require considerably higher signaling overheads
(and therefore longer restoration times). Meanwhile the third method yields faster
recovery timescales.
Another dual failure recovery scheme is also proposed in [12], by combining both
pre-fault protection and post-fault restorations strategies. Namely, protection is
used to reserve backup capacity so as to ensure that the majority of affected (failed)
demands can be restored via pre-computed backup routes upon the occurrence of
10
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Figure 2.1: Scenarios of dual-link failure
dual-link failures. Meanwhile the restoration component is dynamically invoked to
search for new backup routes for the remaining (unrestored) demands. Overall,
the proposed protection algorithm uses Bhandari’s scheme [13] to compute a work-
ing/backup path pair. Now, in case of a dual-link failure the scheme switches all
affected demands into their respective backup routes. However, if the dual failure
affects both the working and backup routes, then the scheme invokes dynamic post-
fault restoration to try to re-compute a second backup route. This solution is tested
using a network with 47 nodes and 98 links, and by varying demands from 500 to
11
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2,500 in steps of 500. Overall, findings show that pre-planned protection can achieve
99.5% recovery of all demands against dual-link failures. Meanwhile the remaining
0.5% of demands can also be restored using dynamic restoration, i.e., close to 100%
effectiveness.
Finally, [14] proposes a restoration-based scheme for dual-failures. Namely, this
solution first tries to achieve full 100% protection restorability under single-link fail-
ures, while also maximizing coverage against any further dual-link failures. Specif-
ically, when the first failure occurs, the restoration model attempts to dynamically
compute a backup end-to-end link-disjoint route. This strategy basically uses sub-
graph routing techniques to try to improve dual-link survivability, i.e., done by cre-
ating sub-graph of the base topology, each defined by removing a given link. Hence
the scheme only accepts a request if it can be routed on all existing sub-graphs.
Furthermore after the first link failure, all failed requests are switched to their re-
spective backup routes. Following this, the scheme also evaluates if these demands
can be routed in all of the subsequent sub-graphs of the network without the failed
link. As a result, connections that can be successfully re-routed in all of these re-
maining sub-graphs will have full survivability against all dual-link failures as well.
Conversely, connections that cannot be re-routed are only guaranteed survivability
against the initial single-link failure. The overall scheme is tested for three different
topologies, including the 14-node and 23-link NSFNET network, the 11-node and 22-
link NJLATA network, and a standard 9-node and 18-link 3x3 mesh torus. Overall
results show that the sub-graph routing technique can achieve complete dual-failure
coverage for about 70 - 80% of all demands, i.e., in addition to full single-link failure
protection.
12
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2.3 Multi-Link Failure Survivability Schemes
Multi-link failure scenarios present a generalization of dual-link failures and usually
pose much more complexity for network designers. In particular, these scenarios
can arise during large-scale “catastrophic” events such as natural disasters (earth-
quakes, hurricanes, floods, etc), massive power outages, and malicious WMD attacks.
Now a key challenge here is the fact that multiple failures make it very difficult (if
not impossible) to pre-provision protection routes to recover from all possible link
fault combinations, i.e., guarantee recovery. Hence, the use of probabilistic protec-
tion schemes and/or post-fault restoration is very appealing here. Along these lines
some recent efforts that have tried to address these broader challenges and related
strategies are now detailed.
One of the first studies on multi-failure recovery in (optical) networks is pre-
sented in [7]. Here the authors first try to compute maximally survivable end-to-end
routes for independent link failure probabilities and define a detailed optimization
problem, i.e., maximum survivability under multiple failures (MSMF) problem. This
formulation tries to ensure that there are no overlaps between the backup sub-routes,
but this problem is shown to be NP-complete. As a result the authors propose a
modified heuristic scheme based upon Suurballe’s disjoint path routing algorithm
[7], denoted as maximum survivability protection algorithm (MSPA). This formu-
lation assigns weights to each link, as defined by its respective failure probabilities,
and then searches for two disjoint paths with the minimum total weight, see details
in [7]. The scheme is tested using the 24-node NSFNET network, with an average
node degree of 3.4, as well as a 14-node network with trap topology configuration
and average node degree of 2.4. Tests are done for uniformly distributed link failure
probabilities, and the average connections failure probability is used to evaluate the
scheme. Overall, the MSPA heuristic compares well with some integer linear pro-
gram (ILP) bounds (albeit not for the MSMF problem, which is not solvable). The
13
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scheme also does well with trap topologies owing to its use of Suurballe algorithm.
Meanwhile, [15] presents another recovery scheme for large-regional failures. This
effort is more realistic than that in [7], as it assumes dependency, i.e., correlation,
between multiple failures. Namely, in most disasters scenarios, link/node faults
are expected to have a very high degree of spatial, i.e. geographic, and temporal
correlation [16]. Hence a failure model is defined by specifying an epicenter for each
regional stressor along with an “impact range”, given by R. Here it is assumed that
any network component within this range will fail if the particular event transpires,
i.e., each node and all of its attached links. Using this framework, a dynamic route
restoration mechanism is utilized, although details on this algorithm are no presented
in [15]. The scheme is then tested using the European COST-239 backbone with 11
nodes and 26 links, i.e., average nodal degree of 4.3 [17]. In addition, three different R
ranges are evaluated (50, 150, and 200 km) by ensuring that no network disconnection
occurs. Finally, the connection demands are varied up to a maximum value, Dmax.
Results for R values of 50 and 150 km show up to 15% traffic loss, and this figure
increases to 28% for 250 km. Moreover, the findings also show that the average
increase in network capacity requirements is constant for different request sizes, i.e.,
Dmax, concluding that on average a 4% increase in network capacity is sufficient to
re-route the remaining demands after a failure event.
Finally [6] presents a very comprehensive study of diverse route protection under
probabilistic failure events. Here the concept of a share risk link group (SRLG) [18]
is generalized to introduce a stochastic/random element, i.e., probabilistic-SRLG (p-
SRLG). In particular, a p-SRLG is defined as a set of links which can fail with a
non-zero failure probability given the occurrence of the SRLG event. However, it is
important to note that this model assumes that all links within a given SRLG fail in
an independent manner, i.e., no correlation. Leveraging this framework, the authors
consider the case of computing two link-disjoint working/backup routes with min-
14
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imum joint failure probability under the assumption that only one “catastrophic”
SRLG event will occur at a given time, i.e., mutually-exclusive. This problem is
shown to be NP-compete and a reduced ILP model is then developed along with a
greedy heuristic. In particular, the latter scheme applies a two-step graph-theoretic
approach to compute working/backup path routes. First, a modified graph is gen-
erated with link weights equal to the link failure probabilities averaged across all
possible SRLG events. The shortest route on this graph is then chosen using Dijk-
stra’s algorithm [19] and set as the the primary (working) route. Next, the primary
route links are pruned and the remaining link weights are re-adjusted to compute a
second path, i.e., backup route, again utilizing Dijkstra’s algorithm. In particular,
the link weights are re-assigned with the objective of reducing the joint path failure
probability, see [6] for details. Note that the authors also define another more basic
heuristic which does not modify the link weights after pruning the working route, i.e.,
termed as shortest disjoint path (SDP) scheme. These algorithms are then analyzed
for randomly-generated network topologies with different node counts, where each
topology has minimal 3-connectivity and node degree under 5. Most notably, the
ILP defined above is also solved here for amenable network sizes using the CPLEX
toolkit. Tests are done for 20 SRLG events and the overall findings show that the ILP
scheme always yields the most reliable path pair, i.e., lowest joint path failure prob-
ability. However the greedy heuristic is also very close and consistently outperforms
the SDP scheme.
2.4 Open Challenges in Network Survivability
Although the above-detailed studies on multi-failure recovery represent some key
contributions in the field, there are still many open challenges. Foremost, the pro-
posed schemes only focus on risk mitigation concerns, to the exclusion of other issues,
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particularly TE resource efficiency. Hence there is a very high likelihood that these
algorithms will yield overly lengthy (working, backup) routes as they implement
detours around higher risk failure regions. In turn, this will increase resource con-
sumption and lead to higher blocking rates and lower revenues for network operators.
In addition, none of the proposed schemes have been tested for post-fault failure re-
covery, i.e., performance in terms of failed/survived connections. Instead, researchers
have only measured the aggregate failure risks of the computed paths [6], which only
provides a loose indicator of the relative protection capabilities, or analyzed the in-
creased capacity requirements of re-routing once a failure event occurs [15]. Finally,
the use of proactive post-fault restoration schemes has not been considered for multi-
failure settings either, i.e., to try recover failed connection routes after a large-scale
event. Indeed, restoration-based schemes can still provide a very credible “last-line-
of-defense” against multiple failures, depending upon network load conditions. In
light of the above, there is an urgent need to expand the work in the area of multi-
failure recovery by addressing both survivability and TE resource efficiency concerns.
A detailed heuristic solution is now presented to address these challenges.
Carefully note that some researchers have also studied the impact of multiple
failures on physical networking topologies. Specifically, the aim here is to analyze
the effect of these stressors on key metrics such as network connectivity or resilience.
Overall, such analysis can provide some key insights for longer-term network planning
and upgrade activities. Nevertheless these strategies are not really applicable to
dynamic connection recovery scenarios, as is the focus of this thesis. Interested
readers are referred to [16], [20] and [21] for more details.
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Joint Path Pair Survivability
Scheme
A novel multi-failure path protection scheme is now proposed to jointly incorporate
both resource efficiency and risk mitigation objectives. The solution embodies a
heuristic strategy using graph-theoretic algorithms and is highly-amenable to real-
world implementation. Now in order to broaden the scope of this effort, two different
failure models are incorporated here, including the one presented recently in [6] as
well as a more realistic rendition that incorporates failure correlation within a region.
Full details on these failure models and path protection schemes are now presented,
along with computational complexity analyses.
3.1 Notational Overview
Before presenting further details, the necessary notations are first introduced. In par-
ticular, consider a network topology operating in a generalized multi-stressor environ-
ment. This network can be modeled as a graph, G(V,L), where V = {v1, v2, . . . }
17
Chapter 3. Joint Path Pair Survivability Scheme
represents the set of switching/routing nodes and L = {lij} represents the set of
bandwidth capacity links. In particular, lij represents a bi-directional link between
nodes vi and vj with maximum capacity cij. The available free bandwidth on link lij
is also given by bij. Furthermore, all incoming connection requests arrive in a ran-
dom “on-line” manner and comprise of three key parameters, i.e., the source node,
va, the destination node, vb, and a desired capacity level, c. Hence a request can be
summarized by the 3-tuple {va, vb, c}.
Meanwhile the threat environment is assumed to comprise of N potential stressor
events denoted by the set F = {f1, f2, . . . , fN}. In particular, each event fi ∈ F
represents a SRLG and is comprised of a set of vulnerable links, Xi, within a certain
geographic region/proximity. Now given the severity of such events, it is reasonable to
assume that only one particular stressor may transpire at a given time, i.e., mutually-
exclusive stressors, as also assumed in [6]. This assumption precludes the need for
more complicated inter-stressor dependency modeling and allows one to define a
relative occurrence probability for each particular event, φi, where
N∑
i=0
φi = 1.
Carefully note that the SRLG is only characterized via a set of links, Xi, and not
nodes. However this representation is still sufficiently generic since susceptible nodes
can also be captured by including all of their emanating links.
Now even though individual stressor events are treated as mutually-exclusive here,
the same cannot be assumed of link (or node) failures within a SRLG region upon
occurrence of a stressor. For example, in many cases link failure probabilities will
be heavily-dependent on the proximity of the link from the epicenter of the stressor
event. Along these lines, two different probabilistic-SRLG (p-SRLG) models are used
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to represent link (node) vulnerability within a given region. These are now detailed
further.
3.2 Multi-Failure Models
In general, pre-provisioned protection recovery schemes can benefit tremendously
from prior stochastic knowledge of multi-failure stressor events. It is here that prob-
abilistic models are of crucial importance, as they can help define the location and
relationship between multiple failures. Further detailed are now presented.
3.2.1 Independent Intra-Region Failure
The first p-SRLG model is the same as that used in [6] and assumes fully-independent
link failures within a given region, i.e., no link failure correlation. Namely, conditional
to the occurrence of a particular event fi, each link in the associated failure region,
ljk ∈ Xi, is assumed to fail with probability pijk, which is independent of the failure
probabilities of other links in Xi. In addition it is also assumed that all links ljk /∈
Xi have zero failure probability. This model is further illustrated in Figure 3.1
which depicts two potential stressors (SRLG regions) and their respective link failure
probabilities.
Note that the independent link failure assumption simplifies network analysis as it
allows one to use a simple dot product to compute the conditional failure probability
of an end-to-end route (to a given stressor). Namely, the probability that a routed
path R will fail upon occurrence of stressor fi is given by:
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Figure 3.1: Representation of independent intra-region failures
Prob(Route failure | fi) = 1−
∏
∀ ljk ∈ R
(1− piljk). (3.1)
This formulation is leveraged further in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
3.2.2 Dependent Intra-Region Failures
The p-SRLG model in Subsection 3.2.1 assumes no dependencies between link (node)
failures within a common stressor region. However associated link failure probabili-
ties are expected to vary according to their proximity from the epicenter of a stressor
20
Chapter 3. Joint Path Pair Survivability Scheme
event. Hence link failures within a SRLG region will likely exhibit a high degree of
geographical correlation, effectively precluding independent failure assumptions as in
[6]. To better reflected on this reality, and improved probabilistic model is proposed
here based upon a two-dimensional Gaussian distribution. Specifically, a concentric
probability density function (pdf) is defined for each SRLG event fi as follows:
f(x) =
1√
2piσ2i
e
− x2
2σ2
i , (3.2)
where x is the distance from the epicenter of fi and σi is the standard deviation
(radii) of the stressor. Using this definition, the conditional failure probability of a
link ljk in the share risk link group (SRLG) region is given as:
piljk =
1− erf
(
dijk√
2σi
)
if ljk ∈ Xi
0 otherwise,
(3.3)
where erf(·) is the standard error function and dijk is the closest distance of any
point on link ljk from the epicenter of fi. Hence this implies that links closer to the
epicenter will have higher failure routes, i.e., piljk → 1 as dijk → 0. Carefully note that
the actual epicenter locations and radii (σi values) can be determined by conducting
off-line threat analysis based upon a wide range of inputs, e.g., such as geographical
locations, weather patterns, geopolitical constraints, etc. However, these broader
considerations are clearly out of scope of the work herein and not considered further.
A sample illustration of this dependent failure model is also shown in Figure 3.2 for
a stressor event centered between two nodes.
Carefully note that link failure dependencies preclude the use of dot-product type
computations of end-to-end route failure probabilities. Instead, the conditional route
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Figure 3.2: Representation of dependent intra-region failures
failure probability (to a given SRLG stressor event fi) is now given by the maximum
failure probability of any of the links along the path route R, i.e.,:
Prob(Route failure | fi) = max∀ ljk ∈ R{p
i
ljk
}. (3.4)
This formulation is also leveraged further in Section 3.3.3.
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3.3 Path Protection Schemes
As noted earlier, the focus of this thesis is to improve recovery in stochastic multi-
failure settings. In particular, end-to-end protection is used to route link-disjoint
backup paths and provide rapid switchover recovery after failure events. However
before detailing the proposed solution, some baseline algorithms are first detailed.
These definitions are then leveraged in the new approach and also used for subsequent
comparison analyses (Chapter 5).
3.3.1 Pure Traffic Engineering Strategies
A wide range of TE-based heuristics have been developed for network connections
routing [22], [23], and these schemes can also be adapted and applied for computing
diverse path pair routes. By and large, most solutions here pursue one of two objec-
tives, resource minimization or load balancing. Along these lines, two baseline traffic
engineering (TE) schemes are proposed here using K -shortest path (SP) routing
[24] strategies:
Hop count routing (resource minimization): One of the most ba-
sic TE strategies is to pursue resource minimization by choosing routes
with the lowest hop count. Now for the case of a single working route,
this can be achieved by simply running Dijkstra’s shortest path algo-
rithm with unity link weights. However resource minimization for work-
ing/backup path pairs is slightly more complicated. For example, simply
using a greedy “two-step” approach to first select the shortest working
path (via Dijkstra’s algorithm) followed by its shortest link-disjoint pro-
tection path may not yield the lowest aggregate hop count. This issue
has been addressed earlier, and a modified K -SP approach has been pro-
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posed to select from multiple link-disjoint path pair combinations [25].
Hence this “joint” selection approach is also re-used here, see Figure 3.3
for psuedocode listing. Specifically, a K -SP algorithm is first run to com-
pute multiple working routes between va and vb in the network graph
G(V,L), denoted by {wri}, 1 ≤ i ≤ K. Next, the associated protection
routes, {bri}, for each of these working paths are computed by pruning
their links and running Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm. Based upon
this, the working protection pair {wri,bri} with the minimum aggre-
gate hop count is chosen, see Figure 3.3. Carefully note that the above
computations are only done over feasible network links in order to help
lower blocking probabilities, i.e., links with sufficient available capacity
to provision the request. Namely the link weight for link lij in G(V,L)
is set to unity according to the following expression:
wij =
1 if bij ≥ r∞ otherwise. (3.5)
Although hop count routing can yield the most resource-efficient routes,
it tends to overload certain network links under higher load situations,
leading to increased request blocking rates, see [26].
Load balancing routing: This TE strategy improves upon hop count
routing and tries to achieve more balanced traffic distribution across net-
work links. In particular, this is done by simply adjusting the weights for
feasible network links in a dynamic manner according to their congestion
levels, i.e., and still re-using the same overall K -SP path pair selection
approach detailed in Figure 3.3. Namely, an inverse-weighting approach
is used here as follows:
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wij =

cij
cij−bij− if bij ≥ r
∞ otherwise,
(3.6)
where cij represents the total capacity of link lij, bij represents the cur-
rent available free capacity, and  is a small value chosen to avoid divi-
sion errors. Hence this algorithm chooses the working/backup path pair
{wri,bri} with the minimum aggregate load-balancing cost. Overall,
dynamic link weighting schemes have been shown to give notably bet-
ter performances in terms of reduced blocking probabilities and higher
network loads (revenues), see [26].
Figure 3.3: Pseudocode for TE heuristic strategy: hop count and load balancing
3.3.2 Pure Risk Minimization Strategies.
As noted in Chapter 2, some recent studies in [6] and [15] have also proposed more
specialized routing schemes to minimize the aggregate risk of working/backup path
pairs. For example [6] defines a basic shortest disjoint path (SDP) scheme using
a two-step Dijkstra’s computation, as noted in Section 2.3, see Figure 3.4. This
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algorithm follows a greedy approach where it first computes a working route wr
over G(V,L) with link weights set to the average link failure probabilities across all
possible stressor events:
wij =
∑
fi ∈ F
φipilij ,∀ lij ∈ L. (3.7)
After a working route is found for an incoming request, the algorithm then prunes
all of its links on G(V,L) and tries to compute a backup protection route, br, by
utilizing same link weights from Equation 3.7. Next, [6] also presents an improved
risk mitigation heuristic, termed here as risk minimization (RM), by deriving an ap-
proximation to an optimization problem. Akin to the shortest disjoint path (SDP)
algorithm, this scheme also implements a greedy two-step approach but now per-
forms link weight re-adjustment after computing the working route, wr. Namely,
the working route links in G(V,L) are first pruned and then the remaining link
weights are re-computed, as shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.4: Pseudocode of shortest disjoint path (SDP) heuristic strategy
3.3.3 Joint Path-Pair (JPP) Scheme
In general, TE routing schemes will likely yield higher failure rates at they do not
incorporate a-priori risk state from p-SRLG models. Similarly, risk minimization
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Figure 3.5: Pseudocode of risk minimization (RM) heuristic strategy
schemes will likely yield higher resource usages as they try to achieve path detours
around high risk regions. Hence the proposed joint strategy here tries to achieve a
better balance by incorporating both objectives in the path pair selection process, as
shown in Figure 3.6. In particular, as is done for the TE strategies, this algorithm
first computes a set of working/backup path pairs {wri,bri} over the feasible net-
work links by running the K -SP algorithm and K instances of Dijkstra’s shortest
path algorithm between the source and destination nodes, va and vb. Note that path
selection can either be done using hop count (Equation 3.5) or load balancing (Equa-
tion 3.6) link weighting. As such this yields two renditions of the scheme, JPP-HC
and JPP-LB, respectively. Next, upon path-pair computation, the scheme assigns
a route failure probability for each of the computed routes, as explained in Section
3.2. Finally, it chooses the path pair with the minimum joint path failure probability,
computed as a vector dot product of the path failure probabilities across all failure
events F , i.e., yielding a measure of correlation.
3.4 Complexity Analysis
It is also very important to classify the computational, i.e., run-time, complexity
of the proposed schemes, as this will impact implementation in real-world network
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Figure 3.6: Pseudocode for proposed joint path pair (JPP) heuristic strategy
provisioning systems. Now in general, the TE and joint provisioning schemes in
Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.3 are expected to have higher complexity as they use more
complex K -shortest path (SP) algorithms. Consider the details here:
• Traffic engineering strategies: These schemes are detailed in Figure 3.3 and
basically implement one K -SP computation followed by up to K Dijikstras
shortest path computations. Now the overall run-time complexity of optimized
variants of the K -SP algorithm is O(K(|L| + |V|log|V|)), where |V| is the
number of nodes and |L| is the number of links in network graph G(V,L) [27].
Meanwhile Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm has O(|V|log|V|) complexity.
Clearly the former term is the dominant component here, yielding an overall
computational complexity bound of O(K(|L|+ |V|log|V|)).
• Risk minimization strategies: These greedy schemes are detailed in Figures 3.4
and 3.5 and basically implement two Dijkstra’s shortest path computations,
i.e., O(|V|log|V|) complexity. However, appropriate probabilistic link weights
must also be computed here by looping over all possible stressor events, i.e.,
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O(N |L|). As the number of nodes or stressors may vary under generalized
scenarios, the aggregate computational complexity for these schemes is given
as a sum of these two expressions, i.e., O(|V|log|V|+N |L|).
• Joint strategies: This joint path-pair scheme is shown in Figure 3.6 and essen-
tially runs the same set of graph-theoretical computations as the TE heuristic
in Figure 3.3. In particular, only the only difference here is in the choice of the
final path pair after the K sets are computed. As this selection process is of
minimal complexity compared to the graph-based operations, this scheme also
has O(K(|L|+ |V|log|V|)) complexity.
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Simulation Design
The performance of the various multi-failure protection schemes in Chapter 3 is eval-
uated using discrete event simulation (DES). This method is a very powerful means
of analyzing complex networking behaviors which cannot otherwise be modeled in
a closed-form mathematical manner. In particular, DES simulates the operation of
a system as a chronological sequence of events, triggered in response to a previous
event. The network events here can be either connection requests, control messages,
link failures, etc. Meanwhile the response to any of these events can also generate
further new events and/or terminate or reschedule existing events.
Now a variety of DES tools are currently available, including OPNET ModelerTM,
NS2/ NS3, OMNET++, etc. All of these tools can be found in the public domain,
with the exception of OPNET ModelerTM, which is a commercial package that is
available free of charge for university research only. Although each of these packages
has its own benefits, this effort uses the OPNET ModelerTM tool owing to its com-
plete set of features, i.e., graphical user interface (GUI) support and robust DES
processing libraries. More importantly this tool also provides a full C/C++ inter-
face for developing customized models. Overall, OPNET ModelerTM has gained very
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strong traction with many users in the industrial and academic research sectors.
Given the choice of a simulation analysis tool, the next key step is to design some
realistic network scenarios for evaluation purposes. Along these lines, this chapter
details the network topology configurations used along with the specifies of the multi-
failure stressors. The key performance evaluation metrics used to gauge the schemes
are also presented here.
4.1 Network Topology and Failure Scenarios
Indeed, there are many different network topologies that can be used to evaluate
protection schemes. However, in order to ensure realistic findings, it is very important
to select examples which are reflective of real-world network designs, e.g., in terms of
node count, links, connectivity, etc. In light of the above, a sample US IP backbone
network is selected, see Figure 4.1, comprising of 24 nodes and 43 links. This network
is also used in [6] and has an average node degree of 3.5 links per node, representative
of the increased connectivity level of most commercial backbones. Furthermore, from
Figure 4.1, it can be seen that the distances between nodes is generally less than a
few hundred kilometers (assuming continental US overlay). Indeed, some nodes are
much closer, implying that large scale stressors may impact multiple links.
Given that many of the schemes in Chapter 3 are focused on multi-failure recovery,
it is also important to define a realistic set of regional stressor events. Clearly these
definitions will have a direct impact upon the overall recovery performance. Now, as
detailed in Chapter 3, this thesis utilizes two different failure models within a SRLG
region: dependent and independent failures. As a result, two classes of failures
are also defined for the network in Figure 4.1. Namely the first specifies N = 8
regionalized stressors events, whereas the second defines N = 5 events. Both models
assume that the stressors are mutually-exclusive and are chosen via a random uniform
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Figure 4.1: US IP backbone
distribution. Further details are now presented.
1. Independent intra-region link failures: This scenario defines N = 8 different
(SRLG) stressor events, with each characterized by a pre-defined static failure
region. These regions may or may not be circular in nature. Here all links
within a given stressor region are deemed to fail in an independent manner, as
per the p-SRLG model in Section 3.2.1, and without loss of generality, regions
are centered at network nodes, see Figure 4.2.
2. Dependent intra-region link failures: This scenario definesN = 5 failure regions
with dependent intra-region link failures, as per the p-SRLG model described
in Section 3.2.2. Namely, each region is characterized by a circular Gaussian
failure distribution with varying radii (standard deviation σ), as shown in Fig-
ure 4.3. Specifically, this diagram shows up to 3σ of coverage, which effectively
spans all potential links impacted by the given stressor.
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Figure 4.2: Independent failure scenario with N = 8
4.2 Performance Evaluation
In order to effectively gauge and quantify the performance of the proposed protection
schemes, a variety of metrics are used. The overall goal here is to choose those
measures which help provide a clear understanding of the scheme’s behavior, and
also help differentiate their relative performances.
1. Failure Rate (FR): This metric measures the recovery effectiveness of a scheme
after a (multiple) failure event. Specifically, consider a network with Mactive
active connections immediately prior to a stressor occurrence. After this event
transpires, up to Wfail working routes and Pfail protection routes can fail. How-
ever, depending upon the severity/scale of the failure event, some connections
may experience both working and backup route failure, i.e., Bfail joint path
pairs may also fail. Based upon these values, the FR is given by:
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Figure 4.3: Dependent failure scenario with N = 5 and different radii (σ)
FR =
Bfail
Mactive
, (4.1)
i.e., the total number of affected demands is less than Wfail + Pfail. Carefully
note that Bfail does not count any connections whose source and/or destination
nodes fail. Clearly service cannot be restored in such cases using any form of
path protection.
2. Protection Fail Rate (PFR): This metric measures the fraction of non-affected
working demands whose protection routes are impacted by a failure event. It
is important to measure this value as these working paths will essentially lose
their backup recovery, i.e., as opposed to working paths which fail but still have
unaffected (i.e., non-failed) backup routes. As per the notation used to define
FR metric above, the PFR is given by:
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PFR =
Pfail −Bfail
Mactive
. (4.2)
Carefully note that the above expression discounts the case of joint work-
ing/protection route failures. In addition, any connections with source and/or
destination node failures are not included in the Pfail count, i.e., akin to Bfail.
3. Bandwidth Blocking Rate (BBR): This measure is used to quantify user re-
quest rejection rates. Specifically the BBR is computed as the ratio between
the aggregate bandwidth requested but not provisioned to the total amount
of requested bandwidth. Namely, consider a total of M connections requests
arriving at the network, with the i-th request having capacity ri. Hence the
total requested bandwidth Brequest is given by:
Brequest =
M∑
i=1
ri.
Now further assume that P of these incoming connection requests cannot be
provisioned by the setup phase. Hence the total rejected bandwidth Breject is:
Breject =
P∑
i=1
ri
and, hence the resultant BBR is defined as:
BBR =
Breject
Brequest
. (4.3)
4. Average Route Length (ARL): This last metric measures average per-con-
nection resource utilization and is computed as the average hop count across
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all successful path pairs, i.e., both working and backup routes. Specifically,
consider a network with Msuccess total successful connections, where Wlength is
the cumulative length of all working routes and Blength is the cumulative length
of all backup routes. Hence the ARL is defined as:
ARL =
Wlength +Blength
Msuccess
. (4.4)
Overall, this metric delivers important information regarding the usage of the
network resources. Namely, a larger average ARL may indicate inefficient re-
source utilization.
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Results and Analysis
The performance of the proposed joint routing scheme in Chapter 3 is now tested
using specially-developed models using OPNET ModelerTM. As detailed in Chapter
4, these tests are done using the network shown in Figure 4.1 and two different
failure models are also treated. In addition, comparative evaluations are performed
using the hop count and load balancing TE strategies detailed in Section 3.3.1,
i.e., denoted here as TE-HC and TE-LB, respectively. Furthermore, the pure risk
minimization schemes in [6] are also tested, albeit for the independent link failure
scenario only, i.e., SDP as well as the improved RM approach. Finally, the proposed
joint path pair (JPP) scheme can be applied using either hop count or load balancing
link weight metrics, i.e., as per Section 3.3.3. However, this evaluation study only
considers the latter variant, i.e., JPP-LB, since it is shown to yield improved blocking
and recovery performance in some preliminary tests.
Overall, each simulation run is tested for 2, 500, 000 random connections with
scaled holding times of mean 600 seconds, i.e., exponentially-distributed. Meanwhile
the actual network input loads are varied by changing the mean request inter arrival
time (IAT) values, also distributed in an exponential manner. All network link
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capacities are set to 10 Gb/s and user bandwidth requests, r, are uniformly varied
between 1 Gb/s and 200 Mb/s in 200 Mb/s increments, i.e., to model fractional
Ethernet demands. Furthermore, path pair computation for the TE-HC, TE-LB,
and JPP-LB schemes is done using a value of K = 7. Finally all failure metrics
are averaged by initiating 500 stressors events at random intervals in the simulation.
The results for the two different failure models are now presented.
5.1 Independent Link Failure Scenarios
The various schemes are initially tested for independent link failure scenarios. In
particular, these tests are done for both even (equiprobable) and non-even stressor
event distributions. Consider the findings.
5.1.1 Even (Equiprobable) Stressor Event Distribution
The first set of tests assume that all stressors (SRLG regions) are equiprobable and
occur with the same probability, i.e., φi =
1
8
, as per 8 SRLG regions shown in Figure
4.2. To start out, simulation runs are done to measure the recovery effectiveness
of the various schemes, averaged over 500 randomly-generated stressors (with each
following the independent intra-region link failure model of Section 3.2.1). Results
are shown in Figure 5.1, which plots the associated FR values (Equation 4.1) for
varying input load regimes, i.e., both working and protection path failures. Here it
is clear that the proposed JPP-LB and optimized risk-only RM schemes give the best
reliability and consistently outperform the more basic SDP risk reduction approach,
i.e., slightly over 1% connection failures at very high loads. Also, RM outperforms
the JPP-LB solution at very low loads, yielding close to zero failures. By contrast
the TE-based strategies yield much lower recovery, with close to twice the number
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of failures versus the JPP-LB and RM solutions. Furthermore, the load balancing
TE-LB strategy does slightly better than the resource minimization TE-HC scheme.
Figure 5.1: Failure rate for both working and protection routes (FR)
As noted in Section 4, it is also important to gauge the impact of multi-failure
stressors on the reliability of protection (backup) routes for non-failed working con-
nections. Along these lines, Figure 5.2 plots the PFR results (Equation 4.2) for the
various schemes for different input load ranges and reveals some very interesting
findings. Foremost, the advanced RM risk-based scheme gives the highest failure
rates for backup routes, averaging almost three times more than those for TE-based
strategies. By contrast the joint JPP-LB solution is much more effective here, and
closely tracks the improved performance of the TE-based solutions. Meanwhile, even
though the SDP risk-based solution does better than the RM variant, it still yields
higher protection route failures than the JPP-LB scheme. Overall, these findings
confirm that the JPP-LB scheme provides much better post-fault reliability for non-
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failed connections. In turn this will simplify operational concerns for network carriers
by reducing the need to re-compute and re-provision failed protection routes after
massive network disruptions.
Figure 5.2: Failure rate for protection routes (PFR)
The results in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 strictly focus on connection reliability analysis.
Hence additional metrics are now used to gauge overall TE performance as well.
In particular, the average blocking performances of the four schemes (BBR values,
Equation 4.3) are plotted in Figure 5.3 using a log-scale to cover a wide range of
operational input load regimes. These results clearly show major shortcomings with
the pure risk-based strategies in [6], with neither scheme (RM, SDP) giving under
1% blocking for almost all input traffic loads. By contrast, the pure TE and proposed
JPP-LB algorithms are much more effective here, yielding many orders of magnitude
lower demand blocking at low-to-medium load ranges. In particular, the JPP-LB
scheme is very competitive here as it consistently outperforms the TE-HC heuristic
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and closely tracks the TE-LB scheme (which gives the lowest blocking). As per these
findings, it is likely that the SDP and RM schemes may see limited deployment in
real-world settings as their increased blocking rates will yield much lower levels of
carried load, i.e., reduced revenues, for network carriers. This is a key finding of this
work.
Figure 5.3: User request blocking rate (BBR)
Finally, Figure 5.4 plots the average resource utilization of the working/protection
path pairs using the ARL metric (Equation 4.4). As expected, the TE-HC scheme
gives the lowest usage and closely followed by the TE-LB algorithm. By contrast,
the risk-based strategies are much more inefficient as they generate longer route
pairs to detour around higher-risk regions. For example, the RM scheme in [6] gives
almost two times longer routes than the TE-LB solution. Meanwhile the JPP-LB
solution achieves a very good balance here, with average route lengths much closer
to the TE-based schemes, i.e., about 15% higher usages. Overall, these findings also
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corroborate the relative blocking rate performances for the schemes, as observed in
Figure 5.3. Finally, it is also noted that higher input loads lead to a slight increase
in resource utilization, i.e., as higher blocking values lead to longer route selection
for all schemes.
Figure 5.4: Average connection resource utilization (ARL)
5.1.2 Non-Even Stressor Event Distribution
The case of non-even stressor occurrences is tested next in order to model regions with
higher/lower risk exposures. In particular, 3 of the SRLG regions in Figure 4.2 are
given increased occurrence probabilities, i.e., φ1 = 0.2, and φ1 = 0.3. Meanwhile all
other occurrence probabilities are fixed to φ3 = 0.1. As per Section 5.1.1, simulations
are first done to measure the FR values, i.e., for both working and protection path
failures (Equation 4.1). The related results are plotted in Figure 5.5 and follow closely
42
Chapter 5. Results and Analysis
along the lines of those for equiprobable stressor events, i.e., Figure 5.1. In particular
the RM scheme gives the best recovery performance, followed by the proposed JPP-
LB scheme (which this time is closer to the SDP heuristic). However, the TE-based
strategies still give very low recovery performance with the load-balancing option
(TE-LB) outperforming the hop count option (TE-HC). The impact of non-even
failure events on backup protection routes is also gauged by plotting the PFR values
(Equation 4.2) in Figure 5.6. Overall these results are very similar to those in Figure
5.2 for equiprobable stressor event distributions. Namely, the risk-based RM heuristic
again gives the highest failure rates for backup routes, i.e., by almost a factor of two.
By contrast, the proposed JP-LBB scheme provides much better post-fault reliability
for non-failed (working) connections and closely matches the TE-based strategies.
Figure 5.5: Failure rate for both working and protection routes (FR)
Simulation tests are also done to measure TE performance. Namely Figure 5.7
plots the overall request blocking rates using the BBR metric (Equation 4.3). Again,
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Figure 5.6: Failure rate for protection routes (PFR)
these findings show excessive demand rejection ratios with the risk-based heuristic
strategies. For example the more advanced RM scheme is unable to achieve under
1% blocking even for very low input load regimes. By contrast the proposed JPP-
LB scheme is more effective and yields blocking rates which are much closer to
the TE-based strategies. Nevertheless, the TE-LB scheme does slightly better than
the JPP-LB scheme for the case of non-even failure distributions, i.e., see increased
separation of curves in Figure 5.7 as compared to Figure 5.3. Finally, average resource
utilizations are also compared in Figure 5.8 using the ARL metric (Equation 4.4).
Overall these results closely follow along the lines of those in Figure 5.4 for the
case of equiprobable stressor distributions. In particular, the risk-based RM and
SDP strategies are very resource-heavy and yield notably longer route lengths. For
example, the route lengths with the RM scheme are almost twice as long as those
with the TE-based schemes. By contrast, the JPP-LB scheme is much more efficient
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and yields route lengths that are much closer to the TE-based approaches.
Figure 5.7: User request blocking rate (BBR)
5.2 Dependent Link Failure Scenarios
Performance evaluation is also conducted for the more realistic SRLG failure model
developed in Section 3.4 (for correlated intra-regional link failures). However, as
noted earlier in Section 3.3, the risk-based RM and SDP algorithms in [6] cannot
handle these cases and are only applicable to independent link failure scenarios. As
a result, this section only presents results for the JPP-LB and TE-based heuristic
schemes. Furthermore, only equiprobable stressor occurrences are tested here, i.e.,
φi =
1
5
in Figure 4.3.
First, the reliability of working and protection routes is measured using the FR
metric and the results plotted in Figure 5.9. Here the JPP-LB scheme gives the
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Figure 5.8: Average connection resource utilization (ARL)
lowest failure rates, averaging almost three times lower than the TE-based metrics,
i.e., increased separation as compared to independent link failures, see Figure 5.1.
Carefully note that increased input loads also tend to drive up the failure rate for the
JPP-LB scheme, i.e., almost 5% higher at heavy loads. Meanwhile, the corresponding
protection route failure rates are also shown in Figure 5.10 and indicate minimal
separation (under 2%) between the proposed JPP-LB solution and the TE heuristic
strategies. These results mirror earlier findings for independent link failures, Section
5.1. However, carefully note that dependent intra-SRLG link failures also yield
slightly higher failure rates (versus independent link failures) for the three schemes
under equivalent input loads. For example, this can be observed by comparing the
FR results in Figures 5.1 and 5.9 and well as PFR results in Figures 5.2 and 5.10.
This observation shows the importance of using more realistic failure models when
trying to gauge multi-failure recovery performances.
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Figure 5.9: Failure rate for both working and protection routes (FR)
Finally, overall TE efficiencies are measured for dependent failures by plotting re-
quest blocking (BBR values) and resource utilization (ARL values) results in Figures
5.11 and 5.12, respectively. Again, these findings confirm that the JPP-LB solution
gives very competitive blocking performance, which is consistently lower than the
TE-HC heuristic and very close to the TE-LB scheme, see Figure 5.11. Meanwhile,
the resource utilization results are also very impressive, averaging between 10− 14%
higher usages. Overall, these findings show that the joint TE and risk minimization
schemes developed in this thesis can allow operators to achieve much better service
reliability without having to sacrifice their service revenues.
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Figure 5.10: Failure rate for protection routes (PFR)
Figure 5.11: User request blocking rate (BBR)
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Figure 5.12: Average connection resource utilization (ARL)
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Conclusions and Further Work
Multi-failure network recovery is a very challenging topic and has become a key focus
for many organizations today. By and large, most existing survivability schemes are
simply not capable of handling massive correlated failures, particularly those arising
during natural disasters, large-scale power outages, or malicious WMD attacks. As
it is very difficult to pre-provision protection resources against all possible multi-
failure node/link combinations, the use of probabilistic recovery schemes has been
proposed to mitigate the risks associated with multiple network failures. However,
there are only a handful of studies in this particular sub-topic area and most related
solutions yield rather inefficient resource performances. Hence there is much room
for improvement to develop new schemes for multi-failure network recovery.
Along these lines, this thesis focuses on building and testing an improved recovery
scheme to handle correlated failures. This novel solution leverages graph-theoretic
heuristics and implements a pre-provisioned protection approach to compute backup
protection routes for working connections. A key innovation here is the design of
a joint path pair selection scheme which takes into account both resource efficiency
and risk minimization concerns. The overall performance of this solution is evalu-
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ated using discrete event simulation for a sample representative national backbone
network. Detailed comparisons are also made against an array of existing solutions.
The overall findings and conclusions from this effort are now presented.
6.1 Conclusions
This research has proposed and tested an effective pre-protection solution to recover
from multiple correlated network failures. The key findings from this effort include:
• The TE-based protection strategies performed as expected and delivered very
high resource efficiency. This conclusion is based upon the ARL metric mea-
surements. Moreover, the TE-LB scheme also gave the best blocking perfor-
mance. However, these strategies yielded the lowest protection recovery rates,
i.e., worst reliability. In particular, the TE-LB did worse that the TE-HC
scheme owing to its selection of longer routes.
• The risk minimization schemes presented earlier in [6] did achieve high reliabil-
ity, with the improved RM scheme doing notably better than the SDP scheme.
However, both of these strategies yielded very high resource utilization and
blocking behaviors, never falling below even 1%. As such, this will pose no-
tably increased costs for network operators seeking to deploy such solutions.
• The proposed solution JPP achieves very good overall results. From a reliability
perspective, it outperformed the basic SDP scheme and in many cases, closely
matched the FR of the improved RM scheme. At the same time, it also yielded
much lower blocking performances, almost on par with the TE-LB scheme. As
such, this solution will provide a much more feasible alternative for network
operators looking to improve service reliability with sacrificing their bottom
line.
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• The correlated failure model proposed in this work (Section 3.2.2) is a good
representation of real-world scenarios, and the proposed JPP scheme can ef-
fectively apply it to improve service reliability. By contrast, the alternate RM
and SDP schemes in [6] are not designed to handle more realistic correlated
failure scenarios.
6.2 Further Research Directions
This effort has proposed one of the first network survivability schemes to jointly in-
corporate both resource efficiency and service reliability (risk mitigation) concerns.
As such, this solution provides a very strong foundation from which to expand and
develop more capable algorithms for the challenging multi-failure problem. For ex-
ample, the further use of post-fault restoration schemes is an area that can be in-
vestigated to help increase survivability rates for user demands experiencing failures
of both working and protection routes. Furthermore, detailed optimization formula-
tions can also be developed to minimize resource overheads and risk exposure costs
based upon the proposed joint heuristic strategy. These formulations can then be
solved (or relaxed and solved) to yield theoretical performance bounds against which
to further gauge the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. Finally, additional studies
can be done to validate the heuristic strategy in distributed routing networks op-
erating with delayed inaccurate routing state, i.e., network topology and resource
information. This will provide detailed insights into the effectiveness of the solution
under real-world conditions.
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